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The privatization of water in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area is a long and complex process
that continues today. The city’s greatest privatization effort, the National Water Law of 1992,
was imposed by the federal government with assurances of improvement in accessibility, quality
and sustainability. The resulting system that exists today has been largely ineffective in achieving
these initial goals. Despite some progress in infrastructure, the partially-private system has
aggravated the very social inequalities it aimed to alleviate, further marginalizing the poorest
citizens through their water’s high costs, far-reaching inaccessibility, and poor quality. In the
decentralized water system, contradictions become apparent. Promises of expansion and
improvement are unkept and unpunished, accountability is lost between government and private
agencies, leaving citizens confused about who holds the responsibility, the blame, and most
importantly, the solution.
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Introduction
The management of water in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA), located in the
North-Eastern region of Mexico, has proved difficult for centuries. However, since entering the
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era of urbanization and globalization it has experienced overwhelming growth in population and
industrialization, which has exacerbated the water crisis for the 20 million people living there
today. The state’s shrinking capacity to manage the water system and failure to improve water
allocation, accessibility and efficiency, allowed the private sector to assume the responsibility in
1993. In line with the neoliberal climate of the time, the Mexican Government looked for
solutions in the form of autonomous, “better-abled” institutions -foreign companies. The 1993
National Water Law placed Mexico City’s water burden into the hands of private entities and
was rationalized by the government and proponents by pledging that water accessibility and
quality would be improved, while both financial and environmental sustainability would be
attained.
Since then the city’s water system has been a center of public and legal attention,
undergoing few profound changes since privatization, and making little expansion or
improvement since the privatization efforts. Numerous attempts of minor policy reforms to
combat the water crisis in Mexico City since the 1980s have resulted in a partially-private water
sector. Today, inaccessibility, social inequality, and general distrust of tap water still define
water culture. In the partially-privatized water system, policies claimed to expand water
availability ended up making access more exclusive, further marginalizing poverty-ridden
communities.

Methods
The primary materials used for research were scholarly economic, political, and
occasionally environmental articles related to water management during the time of study;
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1990’s - 2014. While most studies on public sector privatization emphasized the transition period
during the 1990s, this paper aims to fill in gaps between that period and contemporary times.
Early research was conducted using Google Scholar, later research was specified through
exploration of the sources from more broad articles found. While most research was based on
studies in the field of water management and privatization, some was drawn from official
statements and legislation by the World Bank, the Mexican Government, and other related
institutions.
I aimed to organize my findings in a chronological manner, emphasizing those time
periods and transformations most critical to the story of water privatization in the MCMA. In the
following section, I present the demographic factors relevant to the challenge of water provision
and management, population growth being the most prominent. In the next section I turn to the
neoliberal policies that characterized the 1990s on a global scale, and analyze their influence on
Mexico’s public sectors. The process to privatization in the MCMA has gone through many
superficial and substantial revisions, making it difficult to follow chronologically. Despite this, I
attempt to highlight the most significant steps toward private sector participation in the
penultimate section. The ultimate section is an assessment of water privatization in the MCMA
in 2014, and includes analysis of improvement in water quality, access, and sustainability. In
conclusion, I present the current debate about the future of MCMA water; important
discrepancies are found between the government’s proposals-- backed by those private entities
involved in planned development projects, and proposals put forth by those in opposition,
including water rights activists and environmental groups.
Demography of MCMA
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Demographics within the city have provided one of the most difficult challenges for
government water planners and the private sector. For decades leading up to the current crisis
Mexico City has been the nation’s center for industrialization, urbanization, capital investment
and population growth. The Mexico City of 1940 looked a lot different, with a population of 1.75
million people, by 1950 industrial and economic activities were increasing along with a steady
population growth. As the population grew to an unprecedented size, the government of Mexico
made efforts to organize the urban chaos, including a ban on additional housing being built. By
1960 the population experienced a 73 percent increase in just ten years, with 5 million people,
the metropolitan area now included fifteen boroughs of the Federal District and four
municipalities in the State of Mexico. As a result of urban developments and investments, urban
land use increased 73 percent between 1960 and 1970 (Tortajada 358). Today, the MCMA alone
is home to eighteen percent of Mexico’s total population; a result of the rural-to-urban migration
trend, which had much to do with urban development and low employment rates. In the MCMA,
people come in search of economic opportunity and access to services, but face economic
obstacles in obtaining these services, it is important to note that poverty is most severely
entrenched in these urban areas (Wilder & Lankao 1981).
The steadily increasing demand on the water supply meant more pressure on the local
government -where public scrutiny was generally directed. The Mexican government aimed to
preserve land and discourage further migration into the city from rural regions. It is illegal to
build and reside on conservation land, reducing access to water, sewage and electricity for those
who already live there. However, the “illegal” settler community holds a huge part of the
demographic in Mexico City. By 2003, some 80 percent of new houses were constructed on
illegal land (Tortajada 358).
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Geography of MCMA
Mexico has two percent of the global population and only one percent of the global water
supply. Water provision is a national obstacle, “In 2000, 12 Mexican states were declared federal
emergencies due to prolonged drought” (Wilder & Lankao 1980). Many regions are prone to
drought, inefficiency in provision, maintenance and expansion, leaving millions of Mexicans
suffering from long term water scarcity. The MCMA has more rainy days with London, about 28
inches of precipitation per year, explaining the vast lakes that characterized the area during the
reign of the Aztecs. However, rainfall is not harnessed efficiently, and only supplies the city with
a fraction of the water supply (Wilder & Lankao 1981).
While geographical factors do pose a challenge to water administration, they alone are
not responsible for widespread scarcity and inaccessibility. In order to meet water demand in the
MCMA, over 30 percent of the water supply is imported from outside of the basin. In fact since
the 1990s, average per capita water distribution in the MCMA has been about 300 liters per day,
three times higher than minimum international standard of 100 liters per day (Castro 332). The
concept of “artificial” scarcity is applicable to water in the MCMA, the resource is present, but
inefficient management and infrastructure make it unavailable in many areas. In the 1990s the
MCMA was losing an average 40 percent of water volume through faulty pipes each year
(Wilder & Lankao 1982). At a national level, only twelve percent of the Mexican water supply is
consumed by urban or public users. This in contrast with the eighty percent consumed by the
agricultural sector, which produces a mere four percent of the national GDP. Industrial water
use is only eight percent of Mexico’s total water supply, but the sector is highly polluting and
unregulated (Wilder & Lankao 1982).

6

Neoliberal Solution
Neoliberalism, by definition, is an economic policy model that puts great emphasis on
property rights, rule of law, and free markets to maximize individual freedoms and lead society
to its maximum potential. The sole role of the state is to create and maintain legal and financial
institutions to facilitate free trade among individuals and businesses. In this model, “private
enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are seen as the keys to innovation and wealth creation”
which translates into a new approach for poverty alleviation (Harvey 164). Through this lense,
the development of a country is dependent on their government's ability to create a businessfriendly environment within which enterprises can compete. The government administration of
public goods or services without cost-recovery is argued to create a culture of dependency
among citizens, who, as the direct beneficiaries should pay full market value for all commodities.
A government is seen as inept, unstable, or irresponsible for providing public services or
enforcing protectionist regulations, as they discourage trade and capital growth.
Therefore, development strategies reflect economic policies favorable to private sector
participation in all public life and the adoption of market value for all commodities. All public
enterprises, including education, electricity, transport, public health, water, and sewage, should
be sold and bought on the international market, where they (usually) end up in the hands of
foreign firms with a large capacity for investment (Goldman 789). The increase in private sector
participation has been promoted as the best model for improving efficiency of infrastructure,
extending delivery to poorer areas, and relieving government expenditure (Castro 334).
World Bank
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An important thing to note about global neoliberalism, is that its relatively recent
development and rapid growth were the result of concentrated efforts to subtly but dramatically
alter the ideology of the global policy network on poverty alleviation. The process of how
neoliberal philosophy came to dominate so many policy agendas in Southern countries began in
the 1980s, when World Bank, IMF and major development investors became involved in the
War on Poverty. Privatization soon dominated the conversation on resource management
solutions, as “the World Bank and others maintain that decentralization leads to improved
accountability, empowerment of local communities, and benefits for the management of natural
resources” (Wilder and Lankao 1978). This approach being presented globally as “consensus”
can be attributed to the Bank’s successful efforts in; creating and maintaining exclusive elite
transnational policy networks, and issuing loans targeted at water privatization while imposing
requirements on borrowing countries to open their markets to foreign capital (Goldman 790).
The role of the World Bank, the primary investment facilitator worldwide in development
projects, cannot be underestimated. Looking back, we see that the agenda of the World Bank of
the 1950s and 1960s had little to do with poverty alleviation or global development. During this
time the World Bank operated out of Washington, largely under Wall Street bankers. Loans to
Southern governments were generally small, range remained within capital-intensive
infrastructure projects like railroads or power plants. Post-independence Southern governments
were struggling to meet citizens demands that had been promised to come with liberation, while
suffering immense divestment from the North. As industrialization and urban investment became
central to economic focus throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the institutional jurisdiction of the
Bank and IMF became expanded to (what they call) global development and poverty alleviation
(Goldman 788).
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This transformation is most notable under Bank President Robert McNamara, who
through new policies on the allowance of profitable international bonds, created a marketfriendly environment for huge “development” investors. This secure and profitable arena
presented the Global South in a whole new light to multinational investors, an untapped market
of natural resources paired with bankrupt governments created a large demand for basic services
and an enormous margin for profit. Financial security for these huge Bank loans came from
political and economic guarantees that would minimize risk and maximize control for the
Northern investors that lent to economically or politically unstable countries. The creation of a
low-risk/high-reward market came with new knowledge production sites and think tanks, as well
as pervasive international training in the World Bank development approach. These contributed
to an exclusive professional class of global expertise, being newly regarded as a “development
community”. In the first five years under McNamara (1968-1973), the Bank financed more
projects and loaned more money than in the previous 22 years combined (Goldman 788).
Through the creation of exclusive data analysis sites and the export of the Bank’s neoliberal
ideology, McNamara’s “global expertise” on poverty rapidly began gaining power and influence.
In fact, “by the late 1980s, the Bank’s training center was preparing thousands of professionals
annually, with more than 3000 in the field of economic development alone (Goldman 789).
Global Water Policy
The global policy on water embodied neoliberal philosophy, which under the guise of
“consensus”, led powerful international institutions to accept market logic and set agendas
accordingly. The 1992 United Nations Conference on Water and the Environment resulted in the
adoption of the Dublin Declaration, whose fourth principle enshrines the neoliberal view of
water as an economic good whose allocation can be governed through the market (Castro 334).

9

Through the neoliberal conception, water scarcity in Southern countries is the result of public
policy and institutional failures. A state that suffers recurrent financial or political crisis can not
provide or develop the services or infrastructure required by their citizens. Private entities are
therefore prompted as alternatives to government mediation. In Mexico, the water crisis was
argued to be the result of inefficient administration, the absence of market mechanisms, and the
legal insecurity of water rights (Castro 335). Privatization is put forth as a key strategy for;
“more efficient provision of service by local authorities, private companies and water users, and
for a more efficient and equitable allocation and use of the resource” (Wilder & Lankao 1978).
Full commodification of the natural resource is a strict conditionality for private sector
involvement; the assertion being that without the enforcement of property rights, market
mechanisms will not be effective in achieving goals of efficiency, accessibility, and quality. The
need for a new culture was justified deeming the one that prevailed as an “ingrained dependency
culture”, one in which the state guaranteed the resource, while users reaped the benefits for free.
This claim has been met with public opposition and a growing perception of illegitimacy in
government (Castro 169). The “consumer-pays” and “polluter-pays” principles define the private
sector ambition to obtain financial efficiency and environmental sustainability. These principles
mean that external costs of water provision are assumed by water users via water tariffs. Despite
large discrepancies between high costs and the average family income, these principles are
presented as economic incentives to preserve the resource (Wilder & Lankao 1980). The
neoliberal recommendation for water system management is to; adopt international accounting
methods, submit to grading by international credit agencies, charge full market price, and
establish public-private partnerships.
Political Context of Mexico
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Water rights were a central theme during the Mexican Revolution, which led to the
declaration of water as a public good in the 1917 Mexican Constitution. We see that neoliberal
doctrine did not always define Mexico’s approach to natural resource management. Article 27 of
the Constitution stated; “The property of land and water within the the boundaries of the national
territory belong originally to the Nation, which has had and still as the right to grant control over
them to individuals thus constituting the private property… The nation will permanently retain
the right of imposing on private property the requirements dictated by the public interest, as well
as regulating, for the social well being, the development of natural resources” (Castro 329).
Despite the revolutionary promises of equal access to water and democratic control of its
systems, Mexico has yet to achieve either. Mexico’s neoliberal transformation began in the late
1980s under Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President from 1988 to 1994. While his party was born
out of the Revolution, the country’s faith in democracy has diminished under the 71 year rule of
the Party of Institutionalized Revolution or PRI.
Historically, Mexico has experienced strong state involvement and control of the
economy and civil society. The diminishing role of the state in public life is seen through the
passing of neoliberal reforms of all major public services. Salinas de Gortari’s tenure showed his
compliance with neoliberal ideology through his modernization strategy deemed the National
Development Plan. The plan outlined the opening of the Mexican economy to international
markets via free trade agreements and the removal of protectionist measures. These policies were
aimed at reducing the role and responsibility of the state while increasing private sector
involvement, for example state investment in water infrastructure has been declining since the
National Water Law, despite the steady rise in demand (Wilder & Lankao 1979). Endless urban
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expansion put impossible pressure on the poorly managed water system while the government
was losing popularity and the means to invest, making private sector involvement inevitable.
National Water Law
The most expansive reform in Mexican Water Policy, the National Water Law of 1992,
was enshrined in the National Development Plan, and was much in line with “Global” Water
Policy, as it depended heavily on World Bank funding. This new law “decentralized water
system management from the federal level to state and municipal governments and opened the
door for privatization of municipal service provision” (Wilder & Lankao 1982). The primary
investors in the new water-development initiative were the International Monetary Fund, who
loaned US$200 million, and the World Bank, who loaned a generous US$350 million (Wilder &
Lankao 1982). After going 38 revisions in Congress, the outcome included an amendment to the
Mexican Constitution, the full commodification of the natural resource, the privatization of water
services, the creation of a public register of water rights, and a diminishing state role in public
life. The amendment to Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution changed the status of water from a
public good to an economic resource now subject to market fluctuations and possessing
economic value and tradability in the same way as land. To quote water authorities; “water has
ceased to be a free good and from now on it is a resource which has an economic value and
society must pay for it” (Castro 334).
The Law also called for full governance of water based on market principles, with full
private sector involvement. In 1993, the Federal District Water Commission signed provision
contracts with private firms Suez, Vivendi, Severn Trent, and United Utilities. Among the
responsibilities assumed by the European companies were the formation of a complete register of
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water users, the administration of water metering and the enforcement of water billing. The
formation of the “Public Register of Water Rights” required users to surrender any existing water
titles, then re-apply. The application process often included the submission of property titles, a
defining obstacle for the millions living out of city bounds. Approved users were subject to the
“conditions” of their service, which could translate into volume restrictions or excessive fees
(Castro 335).
In Congress, the opposition was vocal about their concerns, stating that the law would
facilitate the monopolization of the water sector, thus leaving users vulnerable to the “marketset” prices. Additionally, they pointed to the large discrepancy between provisions meant to
protect the market and those meant to protect users’ rights and the prevention of environmental
degradation, the latter of which were almost non-existent. Public opposition came in the form of
popular protest as well as payment and registration refusal by users after implementation. This
resistance was so widespread that even with the appropriate and effective instruments to enforce
the law, non-compliant users only occasionally faced any legal consequences (Castro 170).
Cutzamala Water Provision
“The amount of water coming out of the taps mirrors inequality… Pipe pressure matches
income levels” (Barkin 5). This statement rings true when examining water’s journey from the
city’s main source - Cutzamala. Supply cuts are more common in low income neighborhoods
and costs of water are high -largely due to the hefty electric bill of Cutzamala system, which
essentially includes lifting a small lake 100 km and a journey of 100 km through 30 year old
pipes in desperate need of maintenance. The Cutzamala reservoir system was an expensive
development project aimed at alleviating water shortages and the associated social unrest. The
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head of SACMEX, Manuel Reyes described Cutzamala water as the most expensive in world,
while describing the city’s water department as, “understaffed, underfunded, and overworked”.
The city allocates 2.4 billion pesos to tap water provision, and passes the remaining costs to
consumers through set costs based on “expense-recovery”, a burden heavier in the most
marginalized areas.
The Cutzamala system for example, has deep social implications at its source as well as
its final destination; as with most other reservoirs it lies outside of the MCMA and was imposed
upon an already existent community -the Mazahua, one of Mexico’s oldest indigenous groups.
The Cutzamala system provides about 30 percent of MCMA water, and is met with resistance
from its source community, who claim the system has created scarcity and other environmental
degradation in their area. Since the construction of the plant and treatment facility, the
community has mobilized frequently demanding clean water in every home -an almost absurd
deficiency in an area characteristic of natural springs and healthy rivers. The Mazahua attempts
against the invasion are often met with federally issued riot police, adding to the already
persistent public insecurity.
Cutzamala water passes firstly through the wealthy neighborhoods of Miguel Hidalgo
and Cuajimalpa, where consumers enjoy high water pressure and quality; this area is also home
to the city’s golf courses and many residents afford lawn sprinklers. The aggravating nature of
the system is seen as the pipes run eastward; area incomes levels and pipe pressures decline. The
most eastern settlement of Iztapalapa constitutes 1.8 million people and is known for its deeply
entrenched poverty and high crime rates. The growing community represents a larger trend of
urbanization; the past four decades have brought unprecedented numbers of illegal settlements of
people in search of better economic opportunity and access to resources and services. The

14

development of Iztapalapa was unplanned, and the grievances of its citizens have been largely
ignored due to their illegitimate settlement status. Upon arriving at Iztapalapa, tap water has lost
a third of its volume and even more of its pressure through 150 km of pipes and their associated
40 percent leakage rate. In Iztapalapa, “taps are dry more often than not” and residents are
heavily reliant on imported water from tanker trucks, which “remain a lifeline” despite their
relatively outrageous costs -which can consume up to a fifth of the average family’s income
(Watts 7).
Waste Water
The growing development of urban industry without enforcement of environmental
regulations, explains the high levels of pollution found in urban and development areas (Castro
331). The effective management of wastewater has yet to be achieved as well, as there is no
natural exit, discharging wastewater is one of the largest and most expensive feats for the city.
The system today exists in about 11,000 km of piping through three main channels, which all end
in areas surrounding the MCMA. Water within the city is not recycled, thus it arrives at its final
destination untreated and highly polluting. Tula Valley, about 100 km north of the city, is home
to one of the three largest wastewater plants, making it another high-profile contention location.
Toxins in the water have been proven to affect crops and cause other water-related
diseases, angering locals who claim that their territory has been turned into a dumping ground
without their consent or compensation. Local Sabino Juarez, describes the tendency of the
government to discriminate against indigenous communities by constructing the highly polluting
plant then blatantly disregarding protective measures. In 2008, hundreds of community members
united in protest against toxins in the water. The government responded by deploying riot police
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to the small town of La Cruz, where protesters were assaulted with batons and rifle butts, while
others were forcibly removed and/or tortured. Over six years later, little effort has been made by
the Mexican government to address their claims.

Assessment of Water Privatization
While the concessional model did increase revenue for water companies, the system did
not achieve one of the most popular arguments in its favor: financial self-sufficiency. Mexico has
in fact increased expenditure in the water sector since the privatization efforts. Progress in
efficiency in the water sector can be seen between 1993 and 2000 through the slight
improvement of “installations of taps, meters, creation of customer’s inventory, and water
billing” (Wilder & Lankao 1986). More equitable access to water was another supposed goal of
the water reforms, however privatization has in some cases worsened unequal access to water.
The polluter-pay principle was a central part to address environmental concerns. Costs of
environmental consequences are internalized by private management and passed on to drinking
water users in the form of high water rates on provision and water imports (Wilder & Lankao
1980).
Interestingly, the jurisdictional regions allocated to private firms excluded a portion of
the MCMA, whose inhabitants continue to rely on the government for water provision and
regulation (Barkin 3). Water users in illegal conservation land in the surrounding MCMA tend to
be the poorest, lacking any legitimate access to water, they are most reliant on imported and
bottled water and most subjected to the corresponding high rates. A contradiction arises in the
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privatization argument when the most poverty-entrenched areas marginalized further by high
costs, inaccessibility, and poor quality. Urban areas are home to 75 percent of the population, the
the MCMA the most marginalized communities are those built on private or conservation land
surrounding the city. Due to the illegality of these settlements, services are not provided by the
government. Residents in these communities lack official titles and property rights and are
therefore heavily reliant on illegal, home-made water hookups, which are often unreliable and
insufficient for large populations. Water quality is questionable despite being “treated”. Water
testing is not enforced or made available. Many people must purchase water brought by large
tanker trucks from surrounding areas, which costs up to 600 percent more than city tap water as
private vendors have the freedom to set prices according to demand. Tanker water is also subject
to high import fees, a burden assumed by consumers (Tortajada 358).
Mexico City’s title as the thirstiest city in the world continues to be relevant today. In
2014, engineers estimate that 300 litres are required for each of the 8.8 million residents, the
highest demand of any city in the world. The millions of people that commute daily into the
MCMA for work add to an ever growing demand. Problems of efficiency remain. 40 percent of
water is still lost through leakage in the system, showing about two percentage points of
improvement since 1995 (Wilder & Lankao 1980). Furthermore, 70 percent of residents’ taps run
for less than 12 hours per day, while those of 18 percent provide only an hour or two of service
every few days (Watts 3).
Conclusion
While demography and geography are challenges to water management in the MCMA,
they are not solely responsible for the water crisis. Artificial scarcity arises when the resource is
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poorly managed or unevenly distributed. The late 1980s brought the opening of the Mexican
economy to the international private sector. The neoliberal climate of the time caused a wave of
privatization of public assets throughout the global South. The neoliberal logic to resource
management advocates a passive state role, governance on market principles and an unregulated
private sector. This approach was presented as a “consensus” on global water policy, but reflects
the dominance of neoliberal ideology permeating the world’s most powerful institutions, namely
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In the case of Mexico, the World Bank was
the primary investor in the Mexican National Development Plan of 1990, an ambitious policy
which included an extensive economic reform of public sectors and infrastructure. Under this
umbrella, the National Water Law left a partially private system that is maintained today through
the renewal of short term concessional contracts with foreign water companies (Castro 333).
Proponents of water privatization and the Mexican government promised improvement in
infrastructure, quality and accessibility, and attainment of environmental and financial
sustainability. Under my assessment, their efforts failed to meet these standards. Despite some
progress in infrastructure, the partially-private system has aggravated the very social inequalities
it aimed to alleviate, further marginalizing the poorest citizens through the high cost of water,
lack of access, and poor quality. The flaws of the partially-private system are most visible in
Cutzamala water provision, where accessibility and quality varies greatly depending on the
neighborhood. Illegal settler communities lack property titles, which are a requirement to apply
for water rights under the National Water Law. In this way, vast poverty-entrenched
communities are left vulnerable to market prices and poor water quality, exacerbating financial
instability and poor access to health services.
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Contradictions are seen between the supposed benefits and realities of a decentralized and
privatized water system as many communities continue to suffer from intermittent water service,
inaccessibility, and poor quality. The MCMA water system that exists today is similar to the
fragmented partially-private system implemented in 1993 since it has undergone only minimal
modifications. Comprehensive reform in the water sector should include considerations for all
citizens, which could be achieved through re-centralization of water management,
democratization of the decision making process, and equalized provision. The neoliberal
ambitions of the 1990s have proved incompatible with social equality. Today, the path forward
depends on the empowerment of people, while solutions depend on the creativity of the
collective.

19

Bibliography
Barkin, David. "Mexico City's Water Crisis." NACLA. North American Congress of Latin
America, N.p., 2005. Web. 07 Feb. 2016.
Castro, José Esteban. Water, Power and Citizenship: Social Struggle in the Basin of Mexico.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Print.
Castro, José Esteban. "Urban Water and the Politics of Citizenship: The Case of the Mexico City
Metropolitan Area during the 1980s and 1990s." Environment and Planning A Environ
Plan A 36.2 (2004): 327-46. Web.
Tortajada, Cecilia, and Enrique Castelán. "Water Management for a Megacity: Mexico City
Metropolitan Area." AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment Ambio 32.2 (2003):
124. Web.
Wilder, Margaret, and Patricia Romero Lankao. "Paradoxes of Decentralization: Water Reform
and Social Implications in Mexico." World Development 34.11 (2006): 1977-995. Web.

